Difference between revisions of ".NDE2.ODY5Ng"

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this aptitude or connection between certain passions, & certain and
 
this aptitude or connection between certain passions, & certain and
 
obtain'd or to be obtain'd by them; then is reason ye. proper judge
 
obtain'd or to be obtain'd by them; then is reason ye. proper judge
of Moral obligation, which sees this [[deletion]] aptitude
+
of Moral obligation, which sees this [[deletion]] aptitude [[unclear]] [[/deletion]], &
 +
& it may be defin'd on this supposition, as some already have, ye
 +
connection between ye. Action & ye. motive; for ye. End is ye.
 +
motive, or final cause, & ye. passion is ye. Action, or immediate
 +
natural Cause. A man solely out of Self love may be induc'd
 +
to fulfil yt. obligation which arises from ye. connection between
 +
ye. defensive passion & Ends, or ye. private passions & Ends;
 +
because in yt. case his own interest will make him allow
 +
them ye. proper proportion requir'd. But it he has no affections
 +
yt. point beyond himself, no [[deletion]] thing [[/deletion]] ^ [[addition]] principle [[/addition]] but Self love, what can interest
 +
him in ye. happiness of others, where he was no [[deletion]] connection [[/deletion]] [[addition]] advantage by it; [[/addition]]
 +
or what sense can he have of Moral obligation to promote?
 +
[[deletion]] Consequently on this scheme [[/deletion]] [[addition]] Therefore without publick [[/addition]] or Social Affection there would be no
 +
motive, & [[deletion]] therefore [[/deletion]] [[addition]] consequently [[/addition]] no moral obligation to a beneficent disinterested
 +
conduct.
 +
 
 +
If ye. simple connection between certain passions, or order of
 +
passions, & certain Ends, are what gives us ye. idea of moral
 +
obligation; [[deletion]] [[unclear]] [[/deletion]] [[addition]] why may [[/addition]] not ye. apporitenes of any conduct, & even any
 +
piece of Machinery to answerits end, for an equally strict Moral
 +
Obligation? for ye. Aptitude & connection of ye. Last instances is
 +
as strong & invariable as in ye. former. But we must trace
 +
ye. idea of Moral obligation ^ [[addition]] thro' [[/addition]] a more natural source, [[deletion]] because [[/deletion]]
 +
as this is confounding ye. most obvious differences of things.

Latest revision as of 20:27, 8 June 2018

13.

If ye. idea of Moral obligation is only to be deduc'd from this aptitude or connection between certain passions, & certain and obtain'd or to be obtain'd by them; then is reason ye. proper judge of Moral obligation, which sees this deletion aptitude unclear /deletion, & & it may be defin'd on this supposition, as some already have, ye connection between ye. Action & ye. motive; for ye. End is ye. motive, or final cause, & ye. passion is ye. Action, or immediate natural Cause. A man solely out of Self love may be induc'd to fulfil yt. obligation which arises from ye. connection between ye. defensive passion & Ends, or ye. private passions & Ends; because in yt. case his own interest will make him allow them ye. proper proportion requir'd. But it he has no affections yt. point beyond himself, no deletion thing /deletion ^ addition principle /addition but Self love, what can interest him in ye. happiness of others, where he was no deletion connection /deletion addition advantage by it; /addition or what sense can he have of Moral obligation to promote? deletion Consequently on this scheme /deletion addition Therefore without publick /addition or Social Affection there would be no motive, & deletion therefore /deletion addition consequently /addition no moral obligation to a beneficent disinterested conduct.

If ye. simple connection between certain passions, or order of passions, & certain Ends, are what gives us ye. idea of moral obligation; deletion unclear /deletion addition why may /addition not ye. apporitenes of any conduct, & even any piece of Machinery to answerits end, for an equally strict Moral Obligation? for ye. Aptitude & connection of ye. Last instances is as strong & invariable as in ye. former. But we must trace ye. idea of Moral obligation ^ addition thro' /addition a more natural source, deletion because /deletion as this is confounding ye. most obvious differences of things.