Difference between revisions of ".NDE2.ODc0NA"
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| − | Thosyt. talk | + | Thosyt. talk of ye. Will of God, as ye. Rule of duty, |
| + | don't mean a blind principle of Action, but such a one as is | ||
| + | govern'd by Wisdom & Reason, or a regard to certain Ends in | ||
| + | preference to others. If we don't suppose yt. ye. Deity has | ||
| + | some principle yt. corresponds with our sense of Obligation, | ||
| + | [[unclear]] antecedent Determination of His nature, to prefer some | ||
| + | things to others, we shall not be able to give any reason | ||
| + | why we should any Choise at all; so yt. whatever is ye. ground | ||
| + | of ye. Choise, or [[unclear]] must be ye. ground of ye. Obligation, & | ||
| + | not ye. Choise, or Will itself. This plainly appears from | ||
| + | ye. difference yt. Divines, & Philosophers make, between | ||
| + | Moral & Positive Commands & Duties; ye. former thye thing | ||
| + | obligatory, antecedent to Will, or at least to any Declaration | ||
| + | of it; ye. latter obligatory only, in consequence of a positive | ||
| + | appointment of ye. Divine Will; but how can these be any | ||
| + | foundation for this difference, if all duty & obligation | ||
| + | be equally ye. result of mere Will? | ||
| + | |||
| + | Other Philosophers have tried to lay ye. foundations of | ||
| + | morals much deeper, & on a firmer bottom, viz. ye. the nature & | ||
| + | reasons, ye. truths & fitnesses of things. They say yt. senses & | ||
| + | affections are vague & precarious, & tho they are not, yet | ||
| + | irrational Principles of Action, & therefore very improper | ||
| + | foundations, on which to rest ye. eternal, & immutable [[deletion]] obligation [[/deletion]] | ||
| + | obligations of Morality. They consequently talk much | ||
| + | of ye. Abstract natures & Reasons things, eternal differences & | ||
Revision as of 14:24, 17 June 2018
25.
Thosyt. talk of ye. Will of God, as ye. Rule of duty, don't mean a blind principle of Action, but such a one as is govern'd by Wisdom & Reason, or a regard to certain Ends in preference to others. If we don't suppose yt. ye. Deity has some principle yt. corresponds with our sense of Obligation, unclear antecedent Determination of His nature, to prefer some things to others, we shall not be able to give any reason why we should any Choise at all; so yt. whatever is ye. ground of ye. Choise, or unclear must be ye. ground of ye. Obligation, & not ye. Choise, or Will itself. This plainly appears from ye. difference yt. Divines, & Philosophers make, between Moral & Positive Commands & Duties; ye. former thye thing obligatory, antecedent to Will, or at least to any Declaration of it; ye. latter obligatory only, in consequence of a positive appointment of ye. Divine Will; but how can these be any foundation for this difference, if all duty & obligation be equally ye. result of mere Will?
Other Philosophers have tried to lay ye. foundations of morals much deeper, & on a firmer bottom, viz. ye. the nature & reasons, ye. truths & fitnesses of things. They say yt. senses & affections are vague & precarious, & tho they are not, yet irrational Principles of Action, & therefore very improper foundations, on which to rest ye. eternal, & immutable deletion obligation /deletion obligations of Morality. They consequently talk much of ye. Abstract natures & Reasons things, eternal differences &
