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ALS (5?)


 


 


Ewell Papers                                        August 17, 1885


39.1 (391?)                                                      Ewell, Benjamin S., Williamsburg, Va.


EW 3                                                   to Colonel Thomas Tash(k?)er Gantt 7 p.


 


Folder 5                                               Reply to Harriet's letter concerning


                                                            Peninsula Campaign articles in


                                                            "The Century" magazine.  Joe Johnston


                                                            fair and able; writes from different view


                                                            than Ewell.   Johnston missed opportunity


                                                            in not fighting pitched and decisively


                                                            at Williamsburg.  Details of battle.


                                                            Opinions on Seven Day's Battles.  None


                                                            of the generals equal to Caesar etc.


                                                            Lee's errors.


                                                                                                                        (1)                                           


                                                 August 17, 1885


 


            Colonel Thomas T. Gantt,


                                                My Dear Tasker,  In


a letter, Harriet sent me a half a sheet


of a recent letter from you to her


in which I was much interested.  As


there was nothing in what she sent


but was related to the war & the


recent articles on it in the "Century" I


trust you do not object to my [seeing?] it.


Being tolerably familiar with operations


in the Peninsula in 1861 & 62 most of the Century


articles, on them were most attractive.  Joe Johnston


& Dr. H. Hill, in the Southern & Fitz John Porter


& Franklin on the Federal side were able


& in my estimate, fair.  Johnston's & Porter's


were particularly so.     Johnston,


though, did not write of the Battle [here?]


as I would have done.        By


not farthing [strikethrough] fighting a pitched & decisive


battle with McClellan at Williamsburg he


missed an opportunity not often offered


to Military Commanders.  He had 55000 men


about & a strong line of redoubts 3 1/2 miles in


length at (this is a strikethrough) half of them covered by swamps


& mill ponds too difficult for a "coup de main"


leaving less than 2 miles [    ] for a large


attacking force to approach in.  Then for a distance


of 8 miles below Williamsburg, there


were but two road in which McClellan


could advance, or retreat, & these two roads


converged into one a short distance


below the Redoubts - the land bordering


on the roads being covered with an


undergrowth almost as dense as the


Mexican Chapparal - and further


there were two possible roads each


defended by a strong redoubt - leading


from the Confederate lines - to points


in the Yorktown & Warwick roads


                                                                                                                        (2)


 a mile, or a mile & a half, below


these lines.  Johnston had enough men


to man the redoubts, to resist McClellan


in front - to send a flanking force to


attack both his Flanks, to form


a sufficient reserve, & to furnish a detachment


to repel any threatened movement


up York River & McClellan had not


space enough to handle his Army


within 2 miles of the objective


points.  The very numbers McClellan


had [strikethrough] would have served to [strikethrough] increase


the confusion incident to such a battle, &


to have converted an attack, not entirely


successful, into a disastrous retreat.


Before Johnston came with his army


to the Peninsula, I told [those?]


with whom I conversed on the subject,


that the greatest battle ever, up to that


time, fought in America, would be on


this very ground.  Instead of [strikethrough] this battle the redoubts


of the left of the Confederate lines were


abandoned on Sunday night in the


very face of an enemy.  Hancock the


next day, during the battle, occupied


some of them - one particularly which


commanded the Confederate Center, &


part of the right - knowing the ground


well - having located [one?], and advised


as to some of the other redoubts, I do not


think my assertions can be contradicted.


Having, myself, conducted the troops


that occupied the Redoubts in the left, I


know they were fully garrisoned up to


10 Oclock Sunday night & have never


heard that Hancock had any fighting


to do while entering them on Monday.  I


think I am right then in saying Johnston


lost a great opportunity.  It is true he


 


                                                                                                                                    (3)


might have been defeated, & badly so,


but as you indicate in your letter


to Harriet "nothing venture nothing


won" in War as in other things.  I


knew much less of the ground near


to Richmond where the 7 Days battles


were fought yet something about


Coal Harbor & more about Malvern Hall -


and [strikethrough] I believe that McClellan & Lee had


in those 7 Days each one by the throat


of the other - 1st one & then the other, more


than once.  I thought in those days Porter


was one of the best on the Federal side [strikethrough]


what I read, [now?], confirms my opinion.


How any of the American Generals can


be talked about as if they compared


with Alexander or Caesar or Napoleon


or Malborough, or, perhaps, Wellington,


or certainly Von Moltke - is more than I


can conceive.  Gen Lee began the 7 Days with a


serious blunder attacking the Beaver Dam


Works 24 hours too soon, losing men


& morale.  At Coal Harbor, if McClellan


had sent his whole army to the


aid of Porter, Lee would have been


defeated & Richmond would have


been taken.   If Lee had concentrated his army


at Frazier's Farm ˆ Monday McClellan would have


been routed.  If McClellan had stuck


to Malvern Hills, after the battle Tuesday, the


attacks on him would have been [minimized?]


and the Confederate army would have


been dashed to pieces & if Lee had closely


followed McClellan early on Wednesday morning,


without attacking till Harrison's Landing


was reached, McClellan would have


been [worsted?], if not destroyed.  [However?] I was


told by Gen Barnard & other officers


of McClellan's army.  Tis ridiculous


to talk about the strategy of either side.


As it seemed to me, the [strikethrough] parts


of each army, after Coal Harbor & till Malvern Hills stumbled


about, & fought when they stumbled against


each other without any especial


object, except that on one side the


[strikethrough] goal was James River & on the other


to prevent the 1st from reaching the


goal.  The 1st side making more coherent


attempts than the other.  What Gen Sherman


told you of Grant being a natural Gamester [explains?]


to me something I never, before, understood.  I


told Johnston more than once in the Stanton Campaign


in 1864, that if Grant had been in


command instead of Sherman the campaign


[strikethrough] would have been not half so long &


[that?] Grant would have sacrificed his army


by incautious attacks.  A mistake in front


of an adversary [strikethrough] so observant [strikethrough] ˆ as Johnston


& so careful in keeping his troops in hand, so


as not to be compelled to wait a couple


of days before he could concentrate his


                                                                                                                                    (4)


 army might have been attacked with


very serious results.  I wish I could


follow your advice & write more


plainly.  The habit is too inveterate.


In March, I think, I got a letter from you


& I have kept it near me to answer,


but, as I have done before, I put it


off till the I had nothing to say


though I was full enough when I


read it.  Harriet has been constantly


improving slowly for a year.  It is


doubtful when where she will go when she


leaves Rockbridge.  I trust your health


is better than it was some months ago.


and I remain,


                        Your affectionately


                            Benj. S. Ewell